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Abstract
The experience sampling method (ESM) is often used in research, and promoted for clinical use,
with the rationale that it avoids problematic inaccuracies and biases that attend retrospective
measures of mental phenomena. Research suggests that averaged scores from ESM data are more
accurate than retrospective ratings. However, it is not known how well individuals can remember
information about momentary (rather than averaged) mental states, nor how accurately they
estimate the dynamic covariation of these states. Individual differences in retrospective accuracy
are also poorly understood. In two pre-registered studies, we examined differences between
retrospective memory for stress and self-esteem and data gathered via experience sampling and
examined whether alexithymia predicted accuracy. Results of both studies revealed substantial
discrepancies between retrospective ratings and ESM ratings, especially for momentary states
and their covariation. Alexithymia was positively related to recognition of stress means and
variability but unrelated to recall of either stress or self-esteem, their variability, or their
covariation. These findings suggest that experience sampling may be more useful than self-report
when precise information is needed about the timing of mental states and dynamics among them.
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For Whom, and For What, Is Experience Sampling More Accurate than Retrospective
Report?
The experience sampling method (ESM), also known as ambulatory assessment or
ecological momentary assessment, is an increasingly popular way to gather data from individuals
in their everyday lives. Scholars have suggested that ESM has the potential to enhance basic
psychological research (Miller, 2012), knowledge of psychopathology (Trull & Ebner-Priemer,
2013), and clinical psychological practice (van Os et al., 2017). Indeed, ESM offers a number of
potential advantages over retrospective assessment of mental states and behaviors, such as the
ability to collect timestamped, contextualized data and the ability to construct person-specific,
dynamic portraits of an individual’s functioning (Fisher & Boswell, 2016; Shiffman, Stone, &
Hufford, 2008).
Perhaps the most straightforward benefit of ESM is that real-time assessment minimizes
the inaccuracy and bias that attend retrospective reports of mental states. Several studies
comparing ESM and retrospective measures suggest that memory for past mental states is
flawed, a phenomenon known as the “memory-experience gap.” Most commonly, a negative
memory bias is found wherein the individual tends to recall more intense or persistent negative
experiences than they reported at the time (Ben-Zeev & Young, 2010; Gloster et al., 2008; Kelly,
Kertz, Simpson, Bloch, & Pittenger, 2019; Urban et al., 2018; but see Mneimne et al., in press).
Some studies suggest that this negativity bias may be a component of a more general extremity
bias, in which individuals remember positive experiences as more positive, and negative
experiences as more negative, than actually experienced (Ben-Zeev, McHugo, Xie, Dobbins, &
Young, 2012; Ben-Zeev, Young, & Madsen, 2009; Neubauer, Scott, Sliwinski, & Smyth, in
press; Wenze, Gunthert, & German, 2012). Even so, there is evidence that this bias is larger for
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negative than for positive experiences (Miron-Shatz, 2009; Ganzach & Yaor, 2019). In general,
these studies suggest that averaged experience sampling data provides a more accurate picture of
a person’s actual thoughts, feelings, and behaviors than relying on retrospective summaries of
these experiences.
However, far less research has accumulated regarding the potential benefits of experience
sampling for momentary or disaggregated information – that is, momentary states and
experiences, rather than averages. Some studies do suggest that retrospective ratings of means
and general frequencies are less prone to inaccuracy than estimates of change and instability
(Ebner-Priemer, Bohus, & Kuo, 2007, as cited in Ebner-Priemer & Trull, 2009; Stone,
Broderick, Shiffman, & Schwartz, 2004). However, these estimates are themselves averages of
instability over time and do not directly deal with the timing and sequences of momentary mental
experiences. Likewise, some studies suggest that individuals may overestimate how much
different mental and behavioral phenomena covary (that is, go together in time) for them
(Gloster, Meyer, Witthauer, Lieb, & Mata, 2017; Gloster et al., 2008; Shiffman et al., 1997).
However, in general, comparisons between retrospectively assessed and contemporaneously
assessed momentary information are few. This is true even though experience sampling is
naturally suited to capturing rich momentary data, including not only time-varying psychological
phenomena but also their timing, context, and temporal sequence. Indeed, the extent to which
retrospective self-report is reliable for these aspects of momentary experience would be of great
interest to personality researchers interested in within-person processes (Fleeson &
Jayawickreme, 2015; Revelle & Condon, 2015; Vallacher, Read, & Nowak, 2002), as well as to
clinicians who work with clients to identify triggers or concomitants of momentary negative
thoughts and acute dysphoria.
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In addition, there is little research on individual differences that may affect the memoryexperience gap. Older individuals may show less distorted recall of aggregated affect ratings
(Neubauer, Scott, Sliwinski, & Smyth, in press). Neuroticism, as well as components of
neuroticism such as depressivity and anxiousness, may also influence the degree to which
individuals overestimate how much negative emotion they rated via experience sampling, in
aggregate (Barrett, 1997; Ben-Zeev & Young, 2010; Cutler, Larsen, & Bunce, 1996; Larsen,
1992; Safer, Levine, & Drapalski, 2002; Suls & Howren, 2012). Beyond these specific individual
differences, which only pertain to averaged data, little is known about individual differences in
the memory-experience gap, and to our knowledge no study has investigated individual
differences in memory for momentary (disaggregated) mental states or experiences.
One individual difference that plausibly may influence the utility of ESM in mitigating
distorted memory is alexithymia. This is a dimensionally distributed trait (Keefer, Taylor, Parker,
& Bagby, 2019; Mattila et al., 2010; Parker, Keefer, Taylor, & Bagby, 2008) that describes the
degree to which an individual finds it difficult to identify and describe their own emotional
experience, shows limited emotional imagination, and has a cognitive style focused on external
events rather than internal states (Taylor & Bagby, 2012). Alexithymia shows correlations with
many different deficits in processing emotional information, especially deficits in automatic
processing of negative emotions (Donges & Suslow, 2017). Moreover, some recent evidence
also suggests that alexithymia’s processing deficits extend to non-affective internal states as
well, such as sensation and cognition. Alexithymia relates, for example, to discrepancies between
implicit and explicit self-esteem (Dentale, San Martini, De Coro, & Pomponio, 2010) and to poor
awareness of bodily sensations (Murphy, Brewer, Hobson, Catmur, & Bird, 2018). It may be the
case, therefore, that alexithymia relates to the extent to which individuals process their ongoing
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internal experiences, both affective and non-affective, and can remember them later. Indeed,
many studies suggest that individuals high in this trait have a general deficit in explicit memory
for emotional information (Luminet et al., 2006; Meltzer & Nielson, 2010; Suslow, Kersting, &
Arolt, 2003; Vermeulen & Luminet, 2009; for a review of this literature, see Apgáua & Jaeger,
2019). Therefore, it is possible that alexithymia may relate to the extent to which ESM improves
upon retrospective self-report. However, existing studies have mainly used laboratory-based
designs in which self-reported emotions or sensations are captured contemporaneously with
objective stimuli or after a short delay (e.g., one hour). This limits the direct relevance of these
findings for the utility of ESM in populations both high and low in alexithymia, because
experience sampling’s mnemonic benefits extend primarily to mental states and events that have
occurred at a greater hiatus (e.g., one week). Research also suggests that the timing of
alexithymia’s effects on memory is important (Muir, Madill, & Brown, 2017). Thus, the specific
impact of alexithymia for events that might be captured by experience sampling, instead of selfreported after the amount of time that might elapse in an outpatient clinical context, is not well
understood.
The current series of studies aims to fill these gaps in the literature by investigating the
memory-experience gap for stress and self-esteem states, in both averaged and disaggregated
form, with a one-week gap between ESM ratings and retrospective ones. In both studies,
alexithymia is examined as a correlate of accuracy. In the first study, participants completed
ratings of stress and self-esteem states 64 times over the course of two days before completing
recognition tasks for the averages, changes (timing and magnitude), and dynamic covariances of
these states approximately one week later. Study 2 aimed to replicate this design, using recallbased memory tasks instead of recognition.
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Study 1
The first aim of study 1 was to investigate the extent of the memory-experience gap for
momentary stress and self-esteem states, including both aggregated information (average stress
and self-esteem) and disaggregated information (moment-by-moment stress and self-esteem
states, and dynamic covariance of stress and self-esteem). The second aim was to investigate the
relationship of trait alexithymia to the discrepancy between these variables rated in an
experience-sampling protocol and retrospectively assessed values. We hypothesized that
alexithymia would exacerbate the memory-experience gap for stress and self-esteem. The study
protocol and hypotheses were pre-registered at https://osf.io/ympu6, and study materials and data
are also available at the same repository.
Method
Participants and procedure. Participants were recruited randomly, via email, from
introductory psychology classes at a small university in the Southwestern U.S. Individual
participants attended an initial laboratory visit to complete a demographics questionnaire, receive
instructions for completing surveys on their smartphones, and pick a schedule for ESM survey
completion. They also completed the Toronto Alexithymia Scale-20 (TAS-20; Bagby, Parker, &
Taylor, 1994), a twenty-item self-report measure of alexithymia, at this visit. The TAS-20 is the
most frequently used measure of alexithymia and contains three subscales related to difficulty
identifying feelings, difficulty describing feelings, and externally-oriented thinking. Items are
rated on a 5-point scale. The internal consistency of the TAS-20 in Study 1 was adequate (α =
.81).
Experience sampling. For the ESM portion of the study, participants completed a survey
on 64 occasions using the web browser of their smartphone and Qualtrics online survey software.
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A timer application provided auditory prompts for survey completion. Participants were
prompted to complete surveys every 15 minutes for eight hours, and this series of 32 surveys was
then repeated on a second day. Participants could choose when to start surveys, but they were
asked to complete survey series on days when they would be able to do so faithfully. Each
survey consisted of two questions, which were rated on a visual analog scale using a sliding
response bar and the phone’s touchscreen. Self-esteem was measured with the prompt, “Right
now, I feel good about myself.” Stress was measured with the prompt, “Right now, I feel
stressed.” Responses were coded using a 0-100 scale with anchors at 0 (“Not at all”) and 100
(“Extremely”).
After each participant completed these surveys, their 64-occasion dataset was compiled
and processed. First, their mean levels of stress and self-esteem were computed. Second,
graphical displays (time plots) of their unique stress and self-esteem time series were created.
Finally, dynamic factor models were created for each participant, using LISREL, version 8.12
(Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1993), to represent the covariation of stress and self-esteem in
contemporaneous ratings and across fifteen-minute intervals. An autoregressive model with a lag
of one occasion, in which each variable was regressed on itself at the prior occasion and allowed
to correlate with the other variable at the same occasion, was used as the baseline model for each
participant. If this model did not show a good ﬁt to the data, modiﬁcation indices guided the
addition of cross-lagged regression parameters between one variable at time t – 1 and another
variable at time t until satisfactory ﬁt was achieved. Only lag-1 parameters were permitted in
these models. Thus, five parameters were possible: the two autoregressive parameters, the two
cross-lagged regression parameters, and the contemporaneous correlation between the two
variables. Fit decisions were based on cutoﬀs (Hu & Bentler, 1999) on the Standardized Root
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Mean Square Residual (SRMR; value ≤ 0.1), the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation
(RMSEA; value ≤ 0.08), the Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI; value ≥ 0.95), and the Comparative
Fit Index (CFI; value ≥ 0.95).
As an additional pre-processing step before these models were created, cubic spline
interpolation (Forsythe, Malcolm, & Moler, 1977) with the “spline” function in R software was
used to create equal intervals between measurement occasions for each person. This is a
requirement of dynamic factor analysis (Molenaar & Rovine, 2011). Cubic spline interpolation
fits curves to the observed time series (separately for each variable, day, and individual) and then
re-samples from the curves to create time series with equal intervals between observations. In a
previous paper using experience sampling, cubic spline interpolation produced model parameters
that closely corresponded to those describing the original data (Fisher, Reeves, Lawyer,
Medaglia, & Rubel, 2017).
Memory tasks. Participants were asked to return to the lab for a second in-person session
approximately one week after completing ESM surveys. They were not told the purpose of this
session, except that they would answer some questions about their experience completing mobile
surveys. On average, this second session occurred 6.64 days (SD = 3.92) after completion of
ESM surveys. During the second session, participants were first asked to recall the average level
of their stress and self-esteem during the ESM sampling period, on the same 0-100 scale. Then,
they were asked to recognize their stress means from among four numbers: their mean and those
of three other participants (typically the previous three participants). We used other participants’
means in order to provide a realistic set of alternatives for this task. Participants then did the
same task for self-esteem. All means were rounded to the nearest tenth of a point. Third,
participants were shown four 64-occasion time plots of stress on an 8.5in. x 11in. piece of paper,
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one of which was theirs and the other three of which were other participants’ stress time plots.
Participants were reminded of the timing of their surveys and asked to recognize their own stress
variation over this time period. This task was also repeated for self-esteem. Finally, participants
were shown graphical representations of four dynamic factor models, which represented the
longitudinal covariation of stress and self-esteem for themselves (that is, their good-fitting
model) and three other models, chosen randomly from among the 30 other possible models
(Figure 1). The meaning of the model parameters was explained in detail by a research assistant,
who verified each participant’s understanding by asking them to explain the parameters back.
After participants demonstrated understanding of these models, they were asked to choose their
own pattern of dynamic covariation from the alternatives.
Seventy-five individuals (Mage = 18.6, age range = 18 to 22) enrolled in the study. Of
these participants, 50 (66.7%) reported their gender as female and 25 (33.3%) as male. Five
participants (6.7%) reported their race as Black, none as Native American, twelve (16.0%) as
Asian, fifty-five (73.3%) as White, and three (4.0%) as multiracial (participants could choose
more than one racial category). Twelve participants (19.5%) reported their ethnicity as
Hispanic/Latinx. Of the 75 enrolled participants, 13 did not complete both eight-hour survey
blocks, and two additional participants did not attend the second lab session. The remaining 60
participants, which was the intended sample size at pre-registration, constituted the sample for
Study 1. None of the measured demographic variables (age, gender, race, or ethnicity) related to
attrition between enrollment and completion of the second lab session (p-values > .30).
Results and Discussion
Compliance with ESM Protocol and Variability of Responses

EXPERIENCE SAMPLING AND ACCURACY

11

Participants were generally compliant with the ESM protocol. They completed an
average of 60.13 (SD = 5.21), or 94.0%, of the 64 prompted surveys, with a median of 62
surveys completed. In addition, it is important to examine the variability in the data, as the
current analyses hinge on memory for both stress and self-esteem means (which vary from
individual to individual) and for within-person variability in these variables over time.
Specifically, we calculated the between-person standard deviations, the within-person standard
deviations, and the root mean square successive differences (RMSSD; e.g., Jahng, Wood, &
Trull, 2008) of each variable. The last of these statistics is particularly important for time-series
data, as it indexes how variables change over successive surveys (here, over 15 minutes). Stress
(SDbetween = 18.15, SDwithin = 15.49, RMSSD = 13.90) and self-esteem (SDbetween = 15.36, SDwithin
= 13.23, RMSSD = 13.76) both showed comparable within-subject and between-subject standard
deviations and RMSSD values. 1 This suggests that the memory tasks, in which participants
attempted to distinguish their data from others’ data, were based on adequate between-person
and within-person variability.
Memory Performance and Alexithymia
On average, participants displayed a bias towards recalling more stress (M = 41.35, SD =
23.07) than they rated in ESM surveys (M = 34.20, SD = 20.74), t(59) = 5.53, p < .001, d = .33.
However, their retrospective recall of self-esteem (M = 66.05, SD = 18.26) was not significantly
biased with respect to ESM ratings (M = 65.41, SD = 16.63), t(59) = .656, p = .52, d = .04. In
recognition tasks, 34 participants (56.7%) correctly recognized their stress mean from among
alternatives, which was better than chance, χ2(1) = 30.4, p < .001. Forty participants (66.7%)

In response to a comment by an anonymous reviewer, we will note that the ratios of the between-person and
within-person variances do not exceed the ratio of 1.5:1, which is cited by Rosopa, Schaffer, & Schroeder (2013) as
an indication of heterogeneity of variance.
1
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correctly recognized their self-esteem mean, 40 participants (66.7%) recognized their stress time
plot, and 40 (66.7%) recognized their self-esteem time plot (for each of these three tasks, χ2[1] =
53.4, p < .001). In contrast, they performed at chance levels when asked to recognize how selfesteem and stress covaried during the time they were completing ESM surveys: only 14
individuals (23.3%) correctly recognized their own model of covariation from among
alternatives, χ2(1) = 0.03, p =.86.
Contrary to hypotheses, participants higher in alexithymia correctly recognized their
stress level from among alternatives more often, OR = 3.63, p = .02, and also recognized their
stress time plot from among alternatives more often, OR = 3.95, p = .02, than those with lower
levels of alexithymia (Figure 2). That is, for every unit increase in alexithymia on the 5-point
scale with which it was measured, participants’ odds of correctly picking their stress level and
time plot more than tripled, on average. However, alexithymia did not predict recognition of selfesteem level, OR = .798, p = .67, or self-esteem time plot, OR = 2.12, p = .18. Finally,
alexithymia did not predict individuals’ recognition of their patterns of covariance between stress
and self-esteem, OR = .856, p = .79.
Thus, in general results showed a negative recall bias for stress, but not self-esteem,
consistent with the literature on the memory-experience gap for aggregated negative emotional
experiences (e.g., Ben-Zeev & Young, 2010). Also consistent with this literature, recognition of
self-esteem means was slightly better than recognition of stress means; nevertheless, participants
were usually able to recognize both their average stress level and average self-esteem level from
among alternatives. Memory for disaggregated stress and self-esteem levels, as measured
through recognition tests of stress and self-esteem time plots from among alternatives, was also
fair. This suggests that individuals encode and remember a degree of information about their
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momentary stress and self-esteem states that can sometimes enable them to recognize their own
unique fluctuations in these experiences. However, recognition of the dynamic covariation of
stress and self-esteem (including how self-esteem and stress states are linked to one another and
to themselves across 15-minute intervals) was poor. This finding is consistent with prior studies
suggesting systematic discrepancies between the actual within-person covariance of different
states and events and individuals’ estimation of this covariance (Gloster, et al., 2017; Gloster et
al., 2008). The current results suggest that individuals do not perceive and encode these
dynamics accurately, giving the experience sampling method (along with within-person
analyses) a clear advantage when it comes to uncovering the actual dynamic processes among
different mental states, events, and behaviors.
It was particularly unexpected that alexithymia would relate positively to individuals’
recognition of their stress means and time plots. One possible explanation for this pattern is that
individuals high in alexithymia may have distinctive patterns of stress (for example, different
levels or patterns of variability) that may have aided their recognition of these configurations
from among alternatives, whereas individuals low in alexithymia may have been unable to
distinguish their stress levels and fluctuations from others’. If so, we would expect that this
memory advantage for alexithymia would not extend to recall, where there would be no visual
cues to help individuals discriminate their experiences from others’ in this way. We tested this
possibility in a second study, which replicated Study 1 but used only recall-based measures.
Study 2
The results of Study 1 suggested that individuals high in alexithymia more accurately
recognized the mean levels and variability in their stress over time. This finding was opposite of
what we hypothesized. We reasoned that this surprising effect may have been due to the
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recognition-based nature of the memory tasks used in this study. If people high in alexithymia
had distinctive stress patterns compared to those with more moderate levels of alexithymia, this
may have strengthened their ability to recognize these patterns from among alternatives. If so, we
reasoned that their relative advantage would not extend to recall-based tasks (Vermeulen &
Luminet, 2009). Thus, Study 2 was intended as a replication of Study 1, using only recall-based
measures. Like Study 1, the design and hypotheses of Study 2 were preregistered at
https://osf.io/ympu6, where study materials and data are also publicly available.
Method
Participants and procedure. Participants were undergraduate students from the same
university as in Study 1, and the recruitment method was identical to that of Study 1. Eightyseven individuals (Mage = 18.5, range = 18 to 21 years) enrolled in the study. Of these, 55
(63.2%) were female and 30 (34.5%) were male. Two participants declined to select a gender.
Six participants (6.9%) reported their race as Black, one (1.1%) as Native American, eleven
(12.6%) as Asian, sixty-six (75.9%) as White, and five (5.7%) as multiracial. Seventeen
participants (19.5%) reported their ethnicity as Hispanic/Latinx. Of the 87 participants who
enrolled in the study, 12 (13.8%) did not complete the protocol: 10 did not complete ESM
surveys, one did surveys but did not attend the second laboratory session, and one participant
provided ESM with insufficient variability to be used in the recall procedures. Thus, the final
sample consisted of 75 individuals, which was the pre-registered sample size. As in Study 1, all
measured demographic variables were unrelated to completion of the study (p-values > .64).
As in Study 1, participants attended an initial lab session, where they completed a
demographic questionnaire and the TAS-20. The internal consistency of the TAS-20 in Study 2
was α = .85. Thereafter, participants completed 64 surveys measuring their momentary stress and
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self-esteem before returning to the lab an average of 7.27 days later (SD = 5.66). In this second
lab session, memory tasks consisted exclusively of recall-based measures. First, participants
were asked to recall their average levels of stress and self-esteem during the ESM surveys on a
0-100 scale.
Time plot (recall). Next, participants were given a tablet computer (a Microsoft Surface
Pro) on which a 7 in. x 5 in. (17.5 cm x 13.0 cm) rectangular field was displayed. The left side of
this field was labeled as a y-axis from 0 to 100. Participants were reminded of the times of the
start and end of their first day of surveys and were asked to use the tablet’s stylus to trace their
memory of stress (or self-esteem) within the field, on the 0-100 scale, from the beginning of their
surveys to the end for that day. They then repeated this procedure for the second day of surveys
and then again for the second variable (the order in which stress and self-esteem recall was
measured was randomized). Their traced time plots were then laid over their actual time plots on
an identically sized grid, and the inaccuracy in their recall was quantified as the area between the
two lines, in pixels. The two days’ pixel counts for stress were then added together to create an
overall measure of stress recall inaccuracy; the same was done for self-esteem. These time plots
also allowed us to quantify recall bias in average stress and self-esteem in a second way, by
comparing the error pixels above their traced plots (underestimation) with the error pixels below
(overestimation).
Dynamic covariation (recall). Each individual’s bivariate time series was subjected to
dynamic factor analysis using the same procedure as Study 1. In the final recall task of the lab
visit, a research assistant explained the concept of covariation of stress and self-esteem to
participants in basic terms, including the contemporaneous and lagged relationships that appear
in these models. This explanation was accompanied by a graphical display (a path diagram
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without arrows) representing stress and self-esteem at one survey and at the next. Participants
were asked to complete the diagram by drawing arrows to represent what they recalled about the
covariation between their stress and self-esteem levels during their ESM survey period. Because
there were four variables in the model (stress and self-esteem, each at one occasion and the
following occasion), five arrows were possible: the contemporaneous, undirected connection
between stress and self-esteem; the lagged, autoregressive relationships between stress or selfesteem at one survey and the same variable at the next survey; and the cross-lagged regression
relationships, in which stress or self-esteem predicted the other variable at the following survey
(Figure 1). After participants had done this, research assistants verified their understanding of the
meaning of each parameter by asking the participants to explain them, and any errors in
understanding were corrected as needed. After the task was completed, a model consisting of the
parameters each participant entered was fit to their actual data. The Standardized Root Mean
Square Residual (SRMR) for this model was used to operationalize inaccuracy, as it provides a
quantitative index of the degree of model misfit (Maydeu Olivares, 2017). Because the SRMR
does not penalize models for overparameterization, participants were instructed to draw the same
number of arrows as were needed to achieve adequate fit to their actual data, according to
dynamic factor models derived as in Study 1.
Results and Discussion
Compliance with ESM Protocol and Variability of Responses
As in Study 1, compliance with the ESM protocol was generally good. Participants
completed an average of 61.56 (SD = 3.28), or 96.2%, of the 64 prompted surveys, with a
median of 63 surveys completed. Variability of stress and self-esteem was also adequate, both
between individuals and within individuals over a 15-minute interval for both stress (SDbetween =
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18.15, SDwithin = 17.12, RMSSD = 15.47) and self-esteem (SDbetween = 15.36, SDwithin = 13.23,
RMSSD = 13.41).
Memory Performance and Alexithymia
Table 1 contains descriptive statistics for the three measures of recall inaccuracy (the
difference between participants’ recalled means and their means from ESM surveys, the
difference between participants’ drawings of their stress and self-esteem over time from time
plots constructed from ESM data, and the misfit of participants’ covariance models when applied
to their ESM data), as well as correlations among these indices of inaccuracy. As in Study 1,
participants showed a recall bias for stress, recalling higher average stress (M = 46.95, SD =
21.60) than they reported in experience sampling surveys (M = 37.82, SD = 18.24), t(74) = 6.30,
p < .001, d = .46, 95% CI: 6.25 to 12.03. In contrast to Study 1, participants also recalled
significantly lower self-esteem averages (M = 64.33, SD = 18.04) than they reported during the
experience sampling period (M = 66.36, SD = 15.63), t(74) = 2.20, p = .03, d = .12, 95% CI: 3.87 to -0.19. For comparison, the intraindividual (within-subject) standard deviations for ESM
ratings were 17.29 for stress and 13.53 for self-esteem, on average. This means that individuals’
ratings were accurate to within 0.52 SD for stress and 0.15 SD for self-esteem. Thus, consistent
with Study 1, individuals were more accurate for self-esteem than for stress.
Figure 3 shows the time-plot drawings for the first eight participants (all of these
drawings are available at https://osf.io/ympu6). These drawings also revealed a bias in recalled
stress, such that participants overestimated their stress by an average net count (counted as the
pixels of overestimation minus the pixels of underestimation) of 137,397 pixels (SD = 71,234),
t(70) = 4.12, p < .001, d = 1.93, 95% CI: 71,224 to 204,651. However, this bias was not
statistically significant for the self-esteem time-plot drawings, where participants were generally
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accurate in the levels of their self-esteem relative to their ESM data (M = 13,685 pixels of
underestimation, SD = 220,731), t(70) = .522, p = .60, d = .06, 95% CI: -65,932 to 38,561.
Roughly 29% of the area of the stress time-plot drawings consisted of error, whereas this figure
was only 18% for self-esteem time-plot drawings.
Participants were generally not accurate in estimating the longitudinal covariance of their
stress and self-esteem, with a median SRMR of 0.15. Indeed, fully 75% of the sample had an
SRMR that exceeded 0.08, a widely used guideline for good fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999).
Comparison of the parameters chosen by participants to parameters appearing in participants’
dynamic factor models (Table 2) revealed a systematic bias: participants often underestimated
the “inertia” of their stress, rarely recalling that their momentary stress levels tended to relate to
their stress levels 15 minutes before. The same was true for self-esteem. In contrast, they
overestimated the frequency with which stress would predict self-esteem, and self-esteem would
predict stress, over this same time interval. Thus, they tended to overestimate the dynamic,
lagged links between these two experiences.
Alexithymia. Participants’ level of alexithymia as measured by the TAS-20 did not relate
to any of the measures of recall inaccuracy. TAS-20 scores were unrelated to inaccuracy in recall
of stress means, rs = -.06, p = .61, self-esteem means, rs = -.05, p = .65, stress time plots, rs = .04,
p = .76, self-esteem time plots, rs = .12, p = .32, and dynamic covariation of stress and selfesteem, rs = .05, p = .65. Exploratory analyses relating TAS-20 subscales to these outcomes did
suggest that the externally oriented thinking subscale related negatively to inaccuracy in recall of
stress means, rs = -.289, p = .012. That is, the higher these scores were, the more accurate
individuals were in recalling how stressed they were during the ESM sampling period, on
average. Otherwise, none of the TAS-20 subscales were significantly related to any index of
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recall inaccuracy. In general, these results are consistent with those of Study 1 in suggesting that
high levels of alexithymia do not exacerbate the memory-experience gap; in fact, Study 2
provided some limited evidence that a facet of alexithymia might decrease the memoryexperience gap for stress, but not self-esteem.
General Discussion
The current two studies allow us to quantify the degree to which ESM may be more
accurate than retrospective self-report for momentary (disaggregated) psychological data.
Participants recognized time plots of their momentary stress and self-esteem data only two-thirds
of the time, and roughly 20-30% of the area of participants’ drawings of these time plots was
“error.” Although this degree of inaccuracy does not indicate an absolute advantage for ESM
over self-report, it does suggest that in applications where having information about the exact
timing of mental states is important, retrospective memory for momentary mental states may not
suffice. Timestamped ESM data may be necessary to ensure that that the recovered patterns are
accurate. ESM could thus be particularly useful in studies aimed at uncovering within-person
processes related to individual differences in personality, as well as in clinical applications where
knowledge of both the timing and severity of mental states is essential.
Across two studies, participants displayed a recall bias for stress, exemplified by
overestimated stress means in both studies and overestimation of stress in time plot drawings in
study 2. This finding is in line with prior research showing a tendency for individuals to recall
more negative affect than they reported in real time (Ben-Zeev & Young, 2010; Gloster et al.,
2008; Kelly, Kertz, Simpson, Bloch, & Pittenger, 2019; Urban et al., 2018). Somewhat less
robust was the recall bias for self-esteem, which was small in size and confined only to study 2.
Nonetheless, these findings echo the moderate body of research suggesting particular benefits for
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aggregated experience sampling data over retrospectively recalled experiences, especially
negative ones. Prior research suggests that the size of this bias may depend on the gap between
events and recall (the “fading affect bias”; e.g., Gibbons, Lee, & Walker, 2011). Thus, the
current study may provide a useful benchmark for the degree to which ESM holds benefits over
self-report for aggregated data in some clinically common applications, such as outpatient
therapy (where the gap between events and recall often approximates one week).
Memory for how stress and self-esteem covaried over time was poor. Results suggested
that participants were merely guessing when asked to recognize these patterns, and that most
participants in study 2 did not recall these dynamics with good fidelity, as measured by the
median “fit” of the models they chose to describe their own data. Thus, these results imply a
consistent advantage for experience sampling over retrospective report for information about
dynamic relationships among mental states. This is in line with prior research suggesting that
retrospective ratings of means and general frequencies are less prone to inaccuracy than
information about change and instability (Ebner-Priemer, Bohus, & Kuo, 2007, as cited in
Ebner-Priemer & Trull, 2009; Stone, Broderick, Shiffman, & Schwartz, 2004). This finding also
echoes research suggesting disagreements between the actual covariance of events and mental
states and individuals’ estimates of this covariation (Gloster, Meyer, Witthauer, Lieb, & Mata,
2017; Gloster et al., 2008; Shiffman et al., 1997). That participants were not only inaccurate in
the current study but also biased (in the sense that they recalled more lagged, dynamic relations
between stress and self-esteem and underestimated the inertia in these two states) suggests that
this inaccuracy may reflect participants’ intuitive or folk-psychological theories of how stress
and self-esteem are related. Whatever the source of this inaccuracy, however, the current results
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strongly suggest that if researchers or clinicians want access to accurate information on the
dynamic relationships between mental states, ESM is very likely to outperform self-report.
Our general hypothesis that alexithymia would relate positively to memory inaccuracy
for stress and self-esteem was not supported. In fact, alexithymia related positively to recognition
of stress levels and stress variation, and the specific alexithymia facet of externally oriented
thinking related positively to recall of stress levels. One potential explanation for this finding, as
above, is that individuals high in alexithymia may have distinctive levels of stress and patterns of
stress reactivity, which may be easier to recognize. This interpretation is supported by the
weakening of this effect when recall tasks were employed to measure memory. Another
possibility is that high levels of alexithymia may involve a greater attunement to certain aspects
of moment-to-moment stress experiences. Alexithymia is related to an attentional focus on
external events rather than internal ones (Zimmermann et al., 2005) and a tendency toward an
external locus of control (Hexel, 2003; Hungr, Ogrodniczuk, & Sochting, 2016; Verissimo,
Taylor, & Bagby, 2000). As a result, it may be that individuals high in alexithymia are more
prone to attend to and encode information about stressors than those low in alexithymia and may
use this information in recognizing their stress level, leading to a relative advantage. This
supposition is supported by the advantage in recall of stress that was related specifically to the
externally oriented thinking subscale in Study 2. If this is true, it may also help explain why the
apparent memory advantage for those high in alexithymia did not extend to self-esteem, which
may not track external events as closely. Further research will be needed to confirm these
speculative hypotheses, however.
The current study has several limitations that deserve mention. One such limitation is that
our sample consisted of university students, which may in some ways be unrepresentative of the
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general population, as well as the population of individuals involved in outpatient therapy. For
example, one potential reason that alexithymia did not negatively impact memory for stress or
self-esteem is that the general level of alexithymia in our sample may not have been above the
threshold required for these effects to be exhibited. Thus, further research will be needed to
explore the extent to which the current results generalize to other groups. A second limitation is
that stress and self-esteem were each assessed with only one item in ESM surveys. This raises
the possibility that some amount of the discrepancy between individuals’ true momentary stress
and self-esteem and their recalled stress and self-esteem was due to unreliability of these
measurements. In future studies, multi-item measures of stress and self-esteem would be
preferable to help ensure that apparent memory-experience gaps are not inflated by measurement
error. A related limitation concerns the dynamic factor models used. Because of the need not to
burden participants excessively, the sampling period was limited to 64 occasions, producing a
correspondingly limited degree of statistical power for the parameters appearing in these models.
This raises the possibility that participants may have been more accurate in describing the
covariance of stress and self-esteem than the current results suggest, especially if they were
recalling patterns that are generally true of them but did not characterize the comparatively
limited epoch sampled here. For example, if lagged connections between stress and self-esteem
were truly present, but weak, our sampling regime may not have recovered them. In addition,
because dynamic factor models are contingent on the frequency of measurement, participants
may have recalled dynamics between stress and self-esteem that were accurate but which
occurred at a speed that was not captured by surveys every 15 minutes. Future research with a
greater number of occasions and with a higher sampling frequency will be needed to rule out
these competing explanations.
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Another potentially fruitful avenue of research would be to combine experience sampling
with experimental manipulation of relevant variables, either in a lab setting or in a more
ecologically relevant time and place. This would allow for specific states to be induced, which
would enable the exact timing of their onset to be recorded and compared with later recall.
Future research might also profitably track event-level factors that might impact memory for
momentary experiences. The current study considered a person-level predictor of memory for
mental states, as have several prior studies (Barrett, 1997; Ben-Zeev & Young, 2010; Cutler,
Larsen, & Bunce, 1996; Larsen, 1992; Safer, Levine, & Drapalski, 2002; Suls & Howren, 2012).
But disentangling person-level influences on memory accuracy from event-level factors that
influence memory is certainly feasible with ESM and would be of considerable interest.
The results of the current series of studies suggest that stress and self-esteem data
collected using the experience-sampling method is generally more accurate than retrospectively
reported data at a gap of one week. The extent of this advantage for ESM depends on several
factors, including whether the retrospective assessment involves recognition or recall, whether
aggregated or disaggregated information is measured, and (to a limited extent) the individual’s
level of alexithymia. These results may have implications for research and clinical practice,
especially for applications in which accurate timing is important and in which dynamics among
different experiences are a focus of investigation, as this information is particularly difficult for
individuals to relay with accuracy. Further research will be needed to clarify the boundaries of
these effects.
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Table 1
Spearman’s Rank Correlations among Measures of Recall Inaccuracy in Study 2
Measure

1.

1. Stress mean

-

2.

3.

2. Self-esteem mean

.205

3. Stress time plot

.446***

.099

4. Self-esteem time plot

.402**

.308**

.467***

.002

.021

5. Dynamic covariation

-.025

4.

5.

-

Mdn

IQR

8.32

3.87 - 13.63

4.49

2.52 - 7.92

330,389
-.043

234,741
-

.1507

205,609 –
462,490
141,238 –
346,571
.088 - .234

Note. Inaccuracy for means represents the absolute difference between the means of ESM data
and the recalled means, on a 0-100 scale. Inaccuracy for time plots represents the number of
pixels between the time plots of ESM data and plots drawn by participants, out of a maximum of
2,124,690. Inaccuracy for dynamic covariation represents the standardized root mean square
residual (SRMR) when participant-generated covariance models were fit to their ESM data.
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Table 2
Frequency of Dynamic Covariance Parameters Recalled by Participants and Describing
Participants’ ESM Data
Recalled
Parameter

In model

1. Autoregression: stress predicts later stress

n
42

%
56

n
61

%
82

2. Autoregression: SE predicts later SE

31

41

53

72

3. Cross-lagged regression: Stress predicts later SE

44

59

16

22

4. Cross-lagged regression: SE predicts later stress

22

29

6

8

5. Correlation of stress and SE contemporaneously

54

72

57

77

Note. N = 75 for recall task and N = 74 for models (one participant’s data could not be modeled).
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Figure 1. Four models of dynamic covariance among stress and self-esteem. Straight lines
represent regression parameters in which stress and/or self-esteem predict these states 15 minutes
later, and curved lines represent correlation parameters in which stress and self-esteem covary in
contemporaneous surveys.
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Figure 2. Histograms of TAS-20 scores (scale means) for individuals who correctly recognized
(top) and incorrectly recognized (bottom) their mean stress level and stress time plot from among
alternatives in Study 1. The red lines represent logistic regression curves predicting correct
guesses from alexithymia.
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Figure 3. Time plot drawings for the first eight participants, showing recall of momentary selfesteem and stress throughout successive 8-hour ESM survey bursts against the actual values. The
gray area represents the discrepancy in recall. ID numbers at left show the participants whose
data are represented. Plots for the remaining participants are available at https://osf.io/ympu6.

